EVERYONE with some familiarity with the history of World War II is aware that relationships between the Soviet Union and her Western Allies were tenuous at best. On major issues, such as Russian aid requests and the launching of a second front, major disputes arose. Not as well known is the fact that that same discord also marked the lesser wartime relations. A case in point were the efforts ofthe U.S.A., Canada, and Great Britain to exchange valuable medical and health information with the Russians. Throughout the war, Moscow was not only unwilling to commit herself to any permanent system of sharing but was at times reluctant even to take from the West medical information and techniques she badly needed.
No help wanted scientific and technical exchange, but thus far the Soviets had not upheld their end of the bargain. The Yudin proposal raised hopes in the Foreign Office that Moscow had decided to be more open. The surgical mission, in fact, might prove to be the catalyst of a freer flow of scientific information.7 Anyone who dealt with the Russians, though, quickly learned not to let his hopes climb too high and to expect frequent changes of the Soviet heart. The proposed surgical mission was a case in point. In early February 1943 Professor Yudin informed the British ambassador that London and not he must take the initiative for the mission. Then, a week later, Yudin dropped out of the picture altogether, and medical leaders in London began to see no "immediate prospect of a visit taking place."8
But with equal suddenness, there was another shift. In March, Soviet Foreign Secretary V. I. Molotov informed Ambassador Clark-Kerr that Russia would be happy to receive a surgical mission, although that time Moscow did not mention the Americans. Buoyed by the news of Russia's change ofheart, the British moved speedily to get things ready.
The task of organizng the mission fell chiefly to Sir Edward Mellanby, Secretary of the Medical Research Council and chief medical adviser to the War Cabinet. Acquainted with the whims of Russian diplomacy, Mellanby was determined to avoid any delay which might give the Russians time to change their minds. 9 The first task was to select personnel. Asking for a representative from each of the Services, Mellanby was satisfied with every nominee except the candidate from the Air Ministry, Air Commodore Stanford Cade. Cade's inclusion, Mellanby feared, would hold up the mission's departure, because as a naturalized British subject of Russian origin, he would be suspect in Moscow. As Mellanby explained, the Russians "are extremely touchy on . . . bringing people of Russian birth back to Russia at the present time and make a special point of finding out whether such people have ever had any relation to the White Russian Party."10 The Air Ministry agreed to a replacement, and by mid-April the mission's departure seemed imminent.
Then, an unforeseen problem arose. Somehow the Americans had never learned of the Soviets Hoping to exchange information on many topics beyond the field of surgery-on typhus, for example-the three governments were also determined to make the surgeons' visit the first step towards a permanent medical exchange with the Russians. To whet Moscow's interest in such an accord, the British were even prepared to share highly secret medical information with their Soviet allies.17
Not even a good offer, though, was always sufficient to win One official opinion, apparently, was that Soviet medicine was so effective that problems in the treatment and control of disease simply did not exist. Certainly, it was impossible to find an official who would admit the presence of any epidemic. Yet according to Westerners who had seen conditions first-hand, problems were legion. Major John F. Waldron, a U.S. Army Medical Corps doctor assigned to the staff of Faymonville, the Co-ordinator of Lend-Lease in Moscow, had served in Russia since 1941. Waldron's practice included the American diplomatic and military colony, as well as resident Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Poles, and his experiences up to the summer of 1943 suggested that health conditions were desperate. Typhus, according to Waldron, remained a major and unsolved problem; tularaemia was "epidemic along most of the front"; and malaria was "rampant from the Black Sea to the Arctic". Yet epidemics were only the beginning of Russia's problems. A case in point was nutrition. According to Waldron, "the lower classes are literally starving. Gross evidence of avitaminosis is seen everywhere.""2l
In view of such conditions, Moscow's prohibitions on open discussions made little sense to the Western surgeons, who soon began to wonder why the Russians had invited them in the first place. The best explanation they could find was that Moscow merely wanted to parade Russian surgical technique and to prove that communist medicine had caught up with that in the capitalist West. Vice-Commissar of Health Sergei Kolesnikov, for one, was eager to know what his visitors thought of Russian military surgery and questioned them at length about their views. Admittedly, Russia had lagged far behind the West in World War I, but in the last twenty-five years, he proclaimed, the Soviets had made great improvement. The Russians' continuous posturing and preening reminded American Loyal Davis of the antics of ten-year-old boys "who brag about the size of their houses and chimneys and recklessly claim that their fathers can lick anyone."22
Only at the last session, on the eve of their departure, did the Westerners get the Russian scientists to lower their guard and engage in more open discussion. Taking advantage of the opening, they urged the Russians to consider joining the system of exchange which Canada, the U.S., and Britain had inaugurated and which included routine sharing of research reports and the maintenance by each country of medical liaison offices in the capitals of the others. Vice-Commissar Kolesnikov admitted privately that he was interested in sharing medical secrets without constant government censorship, and his view seemed to be that of other Soviet professionals. But Medicine, 1942 -1962 , Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1964 . ' 
